The immediate aftermath of the tragic attack in Baisaran, near Pahalgam, killing allegedly upwards of 26 people, followed a distressingly familiar script. Indian media erupted, and with almost reflexive speed, culpability was assigned squarely to Pakistan. Shadowy groups, previously unknown (TRF/KRF) and suddenly materialized in 2025 reports, were named as proxies for Lashkar-e-Taiba, despite inconsistencies in reporting details from the number of attackers to their uniforms and weaponry.

While acknowledging the chaos inherent in reporting such horrific events, the unwavering, singular focus on Pakistani responsibility necessitates rigorous critical analysis rather than immediate acceptance.

While inter-agency conflict (RAW vs. ISI) remains a theoretical possibility in regional tensions, the characteristics of the Pahalgam incident point strongly away from a standalone Pakistani-sponsored operation, which would lack strategic coherence unless part of a broader, sustained campaign – something not currently evident. Instead, several factors lend significant credence to the deeply uncomfortable, yet persistent, hypothesis of an Indian "false flag" operation, a self-inflicted injury designed for strategic gain.

Consider the location: Pahalgam lies deep within Indian-Held Kashmir, reportedly 400 km from the Line of Control, rendering militant infiltration logistically challenging and perilous compared to more accessible targets. Furthermore, attacking tourism directly undermines the livelihoods of the local Kashmiri population, making it an unlikely choice for genuine resistance movements. Perhaps most telling was the apparent absence of significant security apparatus in a known vulnerable area at the start of tourist season, despite the volatile context of Kashmir. The timing, conveniently bookended by high-profile Modi meetings yet strategically avoiding disruption of key state agreements, further fuels suspicion, suggesting calculated stage management rather than spontaneous crisis response. This, coupled with the immediate, almost pre-prepared media onslaught blaming Pakistan, creates an overwhelming impression of premeditation – "too much, too soon" to be credible prima facie. It’s hard not to feel the weight of timing: just as Pakistan is wrestling with its own storms—political protests in city streets, families tightening belts as prices soar, and uneasy neighbours on every border—this attack landed like salt in an open wound. It’s the kind of moment an adversary might quietly choose, when everyone’s eyes are turned inward. And when you look back at history—Ganga hijacking, the Parliament strike, the Samjhauta Express bombing, Mumbai, Pathankot, Uri, Pulwama—you see a troubling pattern that too often played out under the BJP’s watch. Those old wounds remind us what can happen when politics and power games overshadow human lives.

If Pahalgam is indeed another instance in this pattern, the crucial question becomes: to what end? While domestic political dynamics and economic uncertainties might argue against large-scale adventurism, the motivations likely extend beyond simple retaliation experienced after Balakot in 2019, which proved potentially counterproductive for India. Non-kinetic options, such as abrogating the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) – an illegal act tantamount to war – are possible. While seemingly insufficient justification for such loss of life, tampering with the IWT serves a dual purpose: applying direct pressure on Pakistan's lifeline and symbolically challenging the treaty's implicit acceptance of Kashmir's current territorial division. Other non-kinetic measures like border closures or maritime harassment lack sufficient impact or carry reciprocal risks. The most potent non-kinetic goal would be achieving Pakistan's international designation as a Terrorist State, leveraging the attack for severe sanctions.

However, public opinion in India, potentially inflamed by manipulated narratives and war hysteria seemingly encouraged by governmental posturing, may demand visible, kinetic retribution. This necessitates exploring potential Indian military objectives, likely planned meticulously in advance. The aim would probably not be all-out war, but rather limited, controlled aggression designed to achieve specific gains while managing escalation below the nuclear threshold. India might seek to emulate US/Israeli unilateral actions, projecting power to bolster its regional dominance, strengthen its position within alliances like the Quad, challenge China, and ultimately force Pakistani acquiescence on outstanding issues.

Given the loss of surprise, India would likely avoid crossing the International Border initially, instead focusing on limited ground operations along the Line of Control under Northern Command. Potential axes include Siachen, Skardu, Bagh, Bhimber, or significantly, the Gilgit-Baltistan region threatening the CPEC route. These operations would likely be incremental, testing Pakistani responses and halting upon meaningful resistance or nuclear signalling, aiming to consolidate gains and present faits accomplis.

Pakistan's strategic response must transcend a Kashmir-centric reaction, thereby avoiding complicity in India's limited war design. Asserting control over escalation dynamics is paramount. Pre-emptive, large-scale military exercises and force concentrations in the Sialkot Sector, threatening vital Indian communication lines to Kashmir, represent a credible deterrent, potentially neutralizing Indian offensive options before they materialize. A proactive military posture is essential; a reactive "wait-and-see" approach courts disaster.

Diplomatically, Pakistan must aggressively counter the narrative. This involves demanding impartial, third-party inquiries (ideally UN-mandated) into the Pahalgam incident, India's recurrent threats against the IWT, ongoing human rights violations in Kashmir, and India's own documented history of sponsoring extra-territorial killings (as alleged by Canada, USA, etc.). If India is going to point the finger, it needs to lay out the proof on the table—no more thunderous threats without a shred of evidence. And while we’re holding them to account, we should also take the long view: turn to international courts, like the ICJ, to address Kashmir’s unresolved status and the broken promise of a plebiscite. That way, we move beyond crisis-driven headlines and build a path toward a lasting, rules-based peace.

Living under a steady drumbeat of staged emergencies and narrative warfare is simply unsustainable. We need to shift from putting out one fire after another to insisting on real accountability and open dialogue. Only by embracing transparency, demanding answers, and committing to shared rules—however uneasy our relationship—can we break free from this endless cycle of proxy battles and build a more stable coexistence.